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PROTECTION OF AUTOMOBILE INSTALLMENT BUYERS:
THE FTC STEPS IN
To INDUCE consumer purchases of automobiles "on time," dealers' often
conceal the high cost of installment plans.' Car buyers can finance a purchase
by cash payment with personal savings or borrowed funds, or by time pay-
ment in installments to the seller or his financing agency.2 Installment sales,
1. Installment buying is expensive. Consumers pay not only the cash selling price
but also a time-sale markup. See note 4 infra. And in the absence of legal restraints, see
note 2 infra, the markups have become exorbitant. See FTC, REPORT ON MOTOR VEHICLE
INDUSTRY 1065 (1939) ; REPORT OF THE STArE BANKING COMISSION AND INTEJUm AD-
vIsoRY LEGisLATIvE CoMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE FINANCE COMPANIES 67 (1935) (hereIn-
after cited as WISCONSIN REPORT) ; Note, Protection of Borrowers in Distribuion
Finance, 60 YALE L. J. 1218, 1222 n. 15 (1951). See further, Findings and Declarations
of Policy, Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 602 (Cum. Supp,
1950).
On the other hand, advantages of the installment plan include: (1) permitting con-
sumers to use goods while paying for them; (2) committing consumers to disciplined
saving; (3) enabling retailers to increase sales; (4) providing sellers and financiers with
a lucrative form of investment. See Evans, Consoner Credit Regulation in a Garrison
Economy, 36 FED. RES. Bu.- 1437 (1950).
Nearly one half of new cars and more than one half of used cars were sold on the
installment plan in 1949. Consumer installment credit based on these sales totaled more
than six billion dollars. AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, THIRTIETII EDITION
OF AUTOMOBILE FACTS & FIGURES (1950), quoted by Circular of the Association of Better
Business Bureaus, Inc., dated October 20, 1950, copy on file in Yale Law Library.
Installment buyers generally have low incomes. See 1950 Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances, 36 FED. RES. BULL. 1441 (1950) (Tables 4, 11). The financial ignorance of in-
stallment buyers has fostered installment plan abuses. See WIscoisIN REPORT 23, 40,
Fifteen percent of those engaged in auto finance and sales have been held responsible
for ninety-five percent of abuses in the field. WISCONSIN REPORT 4. See also Mors, State
Regulation of Retail Instalment Financing-Progress and Problems, 23 J. OF BuS.
U. OF CHI. 199, 201 (1950). But the result of these abuses has been termed "a public
scandal" by Governor Dewey. See BACKMAN, THE BIG CHEAT 12 (manuscript on file in
Yale Law Library; condensation published in Harper's Magazine, Oct. 1948, p. 105).
And according to the Boston Better Business Bureau, "in 1947, as a conservative estimate,
$30,000,000 was being exacted from the public by 'packing' the finance charges on auto-
mobile time payment contracts." See Memorandum from Bureau of Trade Practice Con-
ferences and Wool Act Administration of the Federal Trade Commission, dated February
15, 1950, copy on file in Yale Law Library.
For historical, economic, and legal aspects of installment selling generally, see Berger,
Usury in Instalment Sales, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 148 (1935) ; Mors, Stale Regila-
tion of Retail Instalment Financing-Progress and Problems, 23 J. OF Bus. U. or-"
Cnl. 199 (1950), 24 id. 43 (1951) ; Note, Protection of Borrowers in Distribution Finance,
60 Y.E. L.J. 1218 (1951).
2. Consumers may finance cars through: (1) retail sale credit, cntended by the seller
or his assignee, usually a sales finance company; (2) money or cash credit, extended by
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however, bring the dealer greater profits than sales for cash.3 To retain this
lucrative trade, sellers by two devices deceive consumers: the time sale mark-
up, compensating the financier for credit and risk,4 is disclosed only long after
the car buyer has signed a conditional sales contract with finance charge
columns left in blank ;5 or the seller discloses only a single combined markup
that lumps together the cost of insuring the car with the credit charge for
financing the time purchase. Both methods keep the buyer ignorant of the
installment plan's cost until after he has obligated himself to pay; the second
enables unscrupulous dealers to persuade buyers that "costly" insurance cover-
age, equally indispensable to the buyer's protection in a sale for cash, con-
stitutes the bulk of the lumped markup.0 Thus consumers regard installment
buying as costing little more than a purchase for cash. And shielded by con-
sumer ignorance, dealers may exact exorbitant charges with small fear of
timely detection.
7
Sales finance company practices 8 frequently encourage dealers to "pack"
finance charges and veil the cost of installment plans. If a dealer's capital
a third party as an installment loan repayable on an installment payment basis; (3)
money or cash credit, extended by a third party as a single payment loan repayable at a
stated time and in a single payment. As to wholesale inventory credit, see note 10 infra.
Installment loan credit is extended by commercial banks, small loan companies, industrial
banks, industrial loan companies, credit unions, and miscellaneous lending groups. Huba-
chek, The Drift Toaward a Consumer Credit Code, 16 U. oF Cr. L. RE%. 609, 611 (1949).
Usury laws generally place ceilings on money or cash credit, but permit larger rates of
return for smaller loans. See Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1218, 1218n.1, 1225 nn24-5 (1951).
Retail sale credit, on the other hand, is not considered a "money loan" and thus is generally
free from usury controls. Id. at 1218 n.2; Mors, supra note 1, at 200.
For comparison of the total amount of each type of credit extended from 1929 to 1949,
see Legislation, 63 HAXv. L. Ray. 874 (1950); note 37 infra. See further Hubachel:,
supra, at 613 n. 8. For comparison of the volumes of cash and credit sales of automobiles,
see note 1 supra.
3. Cash sales net the seller onlv his retail markup. Time sales, on the other hand,
yield an additional profit. Most auto dealers do not finance their own time sales, but
assign time sale contracts to external financiers and share in the financier's profit. See
notes 9, 11 infra.
4. "Someone must furnish the money to make up the difference between the price
of the goods and the amount paid down. That someone is entitled to compensation fur
the use of his money and for assuming the risks of repayment and the reasonable expense
of conducting a business." BACKMAN, Op. cit. supra no'te 1, at 1.
5. See Memorandum, supra note 1; WiscoNsix REPoRr 37-8.
6. For discussion of the "lumping" practice, see Wiscosn; REPoar 40; BACXIA;,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 8. Sellers often misrepresent the coverage as well as the cost of
insurance. See id. at 9; WXscoNsnl REPoRT at 47; Memorandum, supra note 1. For sum-
mary of analogous deceptive techniques in the field of money or cash credit (note 2 mspra),
see Hubachek, supra note 2, at 615.
7. See BACKMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, passin; FTC, RmorT on Moro VraxctE
IxhusmY 932, 1064-5 (1939). See further Note, 60 YA I- J. 1218, 12 n.15 (1951).
8. Sales finance com;anies exert powerful influences over installment sellers. In fact,
"after World War I the initiative in determining the terms and conditions of retail in-
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resources are inadequate for direct credit extensions to installment customers,
finance companies take up his installment contracts. 9 And when dealers need
inventory credit, companies may condition wholesale financing arrangements
on dealers' assignment of retail installment paper.'0 The companies, however,
do not compete for the profitable installment contracts by reductions in con-
sumer charges; instead, unknown to consumers, they compete with "kick-
backs" to dealers." These rebates stimulate dealers to "pack" 12  the
stalment financing transactions largely passed from the instalment seller to the finance
company." Mors, supra note 1. at 203. For analyses of the close economic relationship
between finance companies and retailers, see Note, 60 YALE L. J. 1218 (1951) ; WIscoNsIN
REPORT 21-9. See further Moss, Sales Finance Compa)y Operatians in 1947, 34 FED. RES.
Buu.. 781 (1948).
9. "[S]ales finance companies hold approximately seventy-five per cent of all auto-
mobile instalment sale paper originating with automobile dealers and discounted by such
dealers. (Dealers themselves carry about 7% of these instalment sales contracts)." Address
by Thomas W. Rogers, Executive Vice President of the American Finance Conference,
at Purdue University, October' 30, 1950, copy on file in Yale Law Library. See further
Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1218, 12221 n. 11 (1951).
10. "[T]he evil of floor planning [supplying inventory under credit secured by trust
receipts] is the general tendency to coerce dealers into financing sales through the finance
company who does the floor planning." WIscoNsIN REPORT 39. See generally Note, (0
YALE L.J. 1218 (1951); Oil City Motor Co. v. C.I.T. Corp., 76 F.2d 589 (10th Cir.
1935), noted, 35 CoL L. RE'. 1322 (1935). See also notes 46, 47 infra.
Occasionally the charge for wholesale inventory finance becomes exorbitant, parti-
cularly in fields where goods may not be resold to consumers under conditional sales
contracts. See Klett v. Security Acceptance Co., 223 P. 2d 299 (Cal. App. 1950) (charge
for flooring furniture equivalent to 12% annual interest). For the futility of attempting
to curb wholesale credit abuses by usury statutes, see Note, 60 YALE L. J. 1218 (1951).
11. See BACXMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2, 7. Finance companies shave overhead
expenses, not to reduce finance charges for the consumer's benefit, but to offer fatter rebates
to retailers. Cavers, The Consumer's Stake in the Finance Company Code Controversy, 2
LAW & CONTEMP. PoB. 200, 211 (1935). Only by the elimination of abuses such as the
rebate will "competition between finance agencies . . . reduce charges and rates to the
lowest possible point consistent with good business," WIscoNsIN REPORT 58. Rebates
average between 15 and 25 per cent of the finance charge on both new and used cars.
Mors, supra note 1, at 56. Originally merely compensating retailers for recourse liability
on assigned installment contracts, rebates have become powerful competitive weapons
among sales finance companies. WIscONsIN REPORT 34-5: Note, 60 YALE L. J. 1218,
1223 n. 16 (1951).
These rebates may ,be in addition to, or may be disguised as, retailer commissions for
selling to the consumer insurance policies also supplied by the finance companies. In suits
under state statutes regulating rebates, see note 20 inra, courts have split on whether
insurance commissions paid to retailers are in fact a form of participation in the finance
charge. Compare General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Commissioner of Banlks,
258 Wis. 56, 45 N.W. 2d 83 (1950) (insurance commissions paid by a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of a finance company held actually part of dealer rebates paid by the parent),
with Department of Financial Institutions v. Johnson Chevrolet Company, 228 Ind. 397,
405, 92 N.E. 2d 714, 717 (1950) (opinion that authority to regulate rebates was not
authority to control commissions). Whether an insurance commission paid to dealers as
part of an insurance transaction wholly separate from assignment of the installment con-
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finance charges in which they share. Assignment of installment contracts also
enables dealers to rationalize non-disclosure of itemized charges: their com-
putation purportedly is a complex operation requiring the companies' expert
staffs.13 'Moreover, finance companies may directly abet deception of con-
sumers, supplying alternative rate charts for dealers to shuffle and display
to unwary customers for best advantage.1 4
Statutes in several states aim to curb these dealer abuses in installment
sales.I5 Some legislatures invalidate form contracts if credit charges were not
tract can be treated as part of the rebate is not clear. See Wilkie, "Dealer Partiipation'
Includes Insurance Commissions, 5 QuARTRLY REPORT OF THE CON.ERENCE ON PERSONAL
FINANCE LAW 38, 40 (Spring 1951). Commissions from the sale of insurance uncon-
nected with finance probably should be excluded from rebate limits in order to encourage
dealers to make itemized disclosure of insurance and finance for the benefit of consumers.
See notes 17, 26 infra.
Insurance is used as an evasive device in money or cash credit transactions as well as
retail sale credit transactions (see note 2 msipra) : "[It] has become a popular feature in
connection with installment credit, both because it provides protection to the lender and
borrower in case the security is destroyed or the borrower dies and because it can be
a source of an extra and hidden profit. The profit may come to the lender as a commission
for selling the insurance or as a rebate of part of the premium or as a favorable 'experi-
ence rating.' When insurance is required for the purpose of obtaining a charge in addi-
tion to the maximum legal interest rate, it is a device to evade the law." Hubachek,
supra note 2, at 620-1. See further POLLAK, FOUNDATION FOR Economic REsEARcH, SiiAL
LoAN LAWS OF THE UN=rr STATs 25-6 (1949) ; Columbia Auto Loan Co., Inc. v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 193 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1951), affirming 78 A.2d 857 (Mun. Ct. App.
D.C. 1951) (finance company disguising interest as cost of insurance).
12. The term "pack" is sometimes used to mean an overcharge added to the mark-
up by retailers and retained by them, deceiving both the consumer and the finance com-
pany. See WIsco:\sIN REPORT 36. "Packs" are also defined as secret rebates the finance
company pays to the dealer out of an extessive finance charge. See BAcixAn, op. cit.
sipra note 1, at 2. Since in either case the consumer pays the overcharge, "pack" in this
Note refers to any excessive mark-up.
13. See generally BAcMaIAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 8, 12; Gilmore, The Scured
Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 L.Aw & COT.mP. PROB. 27, 38 (1951) ;
PROGRAM AND BRiEFS FOR THE TwExTy-FoURTH ANNIUAL SEssION OF THE Co'T1rE:.Cs
ON PERSONAL FINANCE LAW 17n. 1 (1951). For limited FTC recognition of this argu-
ment, see note 26 infra.
14. The Federal Trade Commission has "'had reason to believe that.., some finance
companies were ... supplying sellers with two or more different rate charts which the
seller could utilize to his own best advantage and usually to the purchaser's financial dis-
advantage." Communication to YALE LAW JOURXL from Jas. M. Mead, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission, dated November 6, 1951, on file in Yale Law Library (herein-
after cited as CommucNIcAnio FROm FTC CHAIRMAN). See further Memorandum, sn pra
note 1; Regulation By Conference, A New Concept of Gonernment, address by Lowell
B. Mason, Acting Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, before the Association of Better
Business Bureaus, Inc., June 14, 1949, copy on file in Yale Law Library; BACETMAN, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 7. For analysis of the technique of deception by use of multiple rate
charts and difficulty in attempting to control it, see Mors, supra note 1, at 46-7.
15. States attack retail sale credit abuses largely by Retail Installment Sales Acts
and Sales Finance Company Acts. As to the content of these statutes, see Mors, supra
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filled in before the consumer signed.16 These and other statutes also demand
pre-sale itemized disclosure of finance and insurance charges.17 A few laws,
note 1; Donaldson, An Analysis of Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 19 RocKY MT.
L. REv. 135 (1947) ; Regulation of Retail Installment Sales: New Statute in Ohio, 63
HARv. L. Rav. 874 (1950) ; notes 16-23 infra. Abuses in the field of money or cash credit
have been left largely to usury and Small Loan statutes. See generally, Hubachek, stipra
note 2; Foster, The Personal Finance Business wider Regulation, 8 LAw & CoNUr-2..
PROB. 154 (1941) ; Bogert, The Future of S mall Loan Legislation, 12 U. OF Cin. L. Rv.
1 (1944). As to the futility of curbing sales credit abuses by usury statutes, see Note,
Protection of Borrowers in Distribution Finance, 60 YALE L. J. 1218 (1951).
In addition to containing disclosure and rate control provisions, many statutes prohibit
miscellaneous installment sale abuses, including, among others: packs added by the seller
for his own benefit (see note 12 supra), Rule I(B) (1), Wis. ADMIN. OaERS 116 (Red
Book 1944) ; refund of less than a required amount of the finance charge in case the con-
sumer accelerates payment; repossessing in case of default in other than authorized nian-
ner; forcing buyers to take out insurance; failure to provide a copy of the insurance
policy; charging more than permissible rate for delinquency and repossession charges;
coercion of retailers by finance companies or manufacturers to secure assignment of In-
stallment sales contracts. See generally Legislation, 63 Haav. L. RaV. 874 (1950). Vio-
lation of the statutes may result in loss of license. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 218.01(3)
(1949). Dealer licenses are required by Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Sales
Finance Companies need licenses in Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Maryland,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. An attempt by Indiana to prohibit local re-
tailers from assigning contracts to out of state (unlicensed) finance companies, see IND,
ANN. STAT. §58-909 (Burns 1943), was declared unconstitutional in Department of
Financial Institutions v. General Finance Corporation, 227 Ind. 373, 86 N.E. 2d 444
(1949). Furthermore, violations may result in pecuniary penalties. See, e.g., CAL. CIv.
CODE § 2982 (c)(e) (Supp. 1951) (conditional sale contract not enforceable if time price
markup exceeds legal limit; buyer can recover total amount paid on the balance due
under the contract). See further Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203 P.
2d 758 (1949)(violation of § 2982(a) requiring pre-sale disclosure renders contract un-
enforceable despite lack of specific penalty in this provision) ; COLO. STAT. ANN. § 449(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1951) (forfeiture of markup, delinquency or collection charges) ; Stride v.
Martin, 184 Md. 446, 41 A.2d 489 (1949) (failure to give buyer a copy of contract entitles
him to recover all payments and deposits). And offenders may be subject to fine or Im-
prisonment. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16B-9 (1950) ($500 fine if sales finance com-
pany operates without a license) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 637 (Cum. Supp. 1950) ($500
for first violation, same plus one year imprisonment for subsequent violations).
16. See note 5 sup~ra. Use of installment sales contracts containing blank spaces to be
filled in after contract execution is expressly prohibited by CoLD. STAT. ANN. c. 16,
§ 446(a) (1) (Cum. Supp. 1951); CONN. Ray. STAT. § 1222b (Supp. 1951); Mr. REv.
STAT. c. 56, § 264-A (1951); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 83, § 118 (Cum, Supp.
1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615(A) (Cum. Supp. 1950). See also note 25 hilra.
17. See note 6 supra. Pre-sale itemization of insurance and finance charges is required
by: CAL. Civ. CODE § 2982 (Supp. 1951) ; CONN. RFy. STAT. § 1223b (Supp. 1951) (but cf.
§ 2402, which permits lumping of insurance and finance charges on auto invoices and order
forms); ME. Ray. STAT. c: 56, §264-A (1951); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 83,
§ 117(a)(Cum. Supp. 1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §614 (Cum. Supp. 1950); Wis.
STAT. §218.01(6)(b) (1949)(but cf. §218.01(6)(em) which allows lumping on Com-
missioner's approval if the dealer finances his own installment contracts). Cf. VA. CoDE




on the other hand, ironically permit lumping of charges until long after con-
summation of the sale.'8 Some states try to compensate for resultant consumer
harm and clamp ceilings on finance charges 19 and dealers rebates.20 But many
statutes do not cover all consumer commodities 2 1 while some are limited to
goods sold under a stipulated price. -2 And significantly, two-thirds of the
states have not enacted legislation to protect consumers from these abuses in
installment selling.2
In an attempt to fill the gap in state legislation, the FTC, acting under
the "unfair competition" provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
18. See notes 6, 7 supra. The following statutes e-pressly permit lumping for the period
indicated, requiring itemization only at the end of that period. CoLo. STAT. Ai.l. c. 16,
§ 446(b) (6) (Cum. Supp. 1951) (30 days); IND. ANNr. STAT. § 53-904 (Burns 1943) (25
days); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 255, § 12 (Cune. Supp. 1948) (requires lumping, 20 days);
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19A15 (2) (Henderson 1951 Cum. Supp.) (25 days; § 9.1482, as
amended, which inconsistently required pre-sale disclosure, see People v. Dale H. Hughes,
Inc., 321 'Mich. 573 (1948), repealed in 1949) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17.16B-6(b) (6) (1950)
(25 days) ; N.Y. PEgs. PRop. LAW § &4-a(g) (25 days); Omo CoDE- § 6346-18 (Page's
1951 Supp.) (25 days). As to Wisconsin, see note 17 supra.
Even Federal Regulation W, aimed at curbing inflation, though possibly once having
the auxiliary purpose of correcting abuses, see Legislation, 63 HAn%'. L. Rnv. 874, 875
(1950), now specifically permits lumping, 32A CoDE: FED. REGs. c. XV, Reg. V § 6(2)
(c) (4) (1950). For a conflicting federal regulation, see note 26 infra.
19. 1m. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-906, 5S-926 (Burns 1943) and Rule 58-926-1 thereunder,
see HoRAcx, 2 IND. AD-11N. CoDE 4403-4 (1941); OHio Comn § 6346-20 (Page's 1951
Supp.). The Massachusetts statute requires a legend on all conditional sales contracts
to the effect that the finance charge is not regulated by law. 'MAss. ANN. Lmaws c. 255,
§ 12A (Cum. Supp. 1948). Of the states requiring pre-sale disclosure, California and
Pennsylvania also regulate finance charges. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 293r(c) (Supp. 1951);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 619 (Cum. Supp. 1950).
20. IND. AN%. STAT. § 58-910 (Burns 1943) and Rule 58-926-1, stpra note 19; W\is.
STAT. § 218.01(5) (a) (c) (1949) and Rule II adopted thereunder, see Wis. Ao.um.
ORDERs 117 (Red Book 1944). See note 11 supra. Cf. COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, §302(7)
(Cum. Supp. 1951) ("Unfair Practices Act," prohibiting secret rebates to "certain pur-
chasers" as destroying competition). Of the states that allow lumping until after the sale,
Indiana regulates both the rebate and the finance charge; Colorado and Wisconsin regu-
late the rebate only; and Ohio regulates only the finance charge. See notes 13-9 m1pra.
21. The following states limit coverage to sales of motor vehicles: California, Colo-
rado, Maine, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin.
22. Connecticut ($3,000 or less) ; Indiana ($2,500) ; Maryland (2,000); New Jersey
($-3,000) ; New York ($1,500) ; Ohio (no limit).
23. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, adopted by 12 jurisdictions, see 2 UaFunM
LAws ANNoTATED 6 (Cum. Supp. 1951), does not deal with deceptive practices that en-
able sellers to misrepresent the cost of installment buying and pack time-sale markups.
In addition to the state statutes discussed supra, see HAwAin REv. L.ws §§ 9162, 9164
(1945) (requiring separate pre-sale disclosure of finance and insurance charges, and limit-
ing former to legal amount of discount on comparable loans of money) ; Regulation for
the Conduct of the Business of Licensed Motor Vehicle Dealers in the District of Colun-
bia (mimeo. 1951) (requiring pre-sale itemization of insurance and finance charges).
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recently promulgated regulations for protecting the installment buyer.2 4 For
automobile installment sales in interstate commerce, the FTC rules compel
pre-sale disclosure of markups, branding use of incomplete blank-space con-
tracts an "unfair trade practice." 25 Moreover, pre-sale itemization in writing
of insurance and finance charges is directed.20 Violations subject offenders
24. TRADE PRAcTIcE RULES RELATING TO THE RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALE AND
FINANCING OF MOTOR VEHCLES, 16 FED. REG. 1059 (1951) (hereinafter cited as RULES).
The rules were promulgated February 6, 1951 after discussions in which industry members
were invited to take part. See Memorandum, supra note 1; Federal Trade Commission
Press Release, dated September 12, 1949, copy on file in Yale Law Library; Reulaliol
by Conference, A New Concept of Government, address by Lowell B. Mason, supra note
14. They issued pursuant to the Commission's power under § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
§45(a) (1946), "to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations ... from using unfair
methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce."
The rules declare each of the following to be unfair trade practices: (RULE I) false,
misleading, or deceptive statements concerning insurance or finance generally; (RULE 2)
failure to itemize costs before the sale; (RULE 3) use of installment sales contract with
blank spaces to be filled in after execution; (RULE 4) use of rate charts to deceive as to
the amount of the finance charge (specifically directed against the use of multiple rate
charts, supra note 14, see COMMUNICATION FROM FTC CHAIRMAN) ; (RULe 5) requiring
purchase of insurance as a condition to sale or financing. The rules are limited to the
sale of Motor Vehicles. See note 21 supra.
For general discussion of the scope and effect of the rules, see FTC "Auto Pack"
Rules Interpreted, 5 QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PERSONAL FINANCE
LAW 34 (Spring 1951). The FTC met considerable opposition when the rules were pro-
posed. See Mors, supra note 1, at 207. The same opposition greeted a proposal in an early
draft of the Uniform Commercial Code to require pre-sale itemization of insurance and
finance charges. See Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code,
16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROs. 27, 37-8 (1951). For a striking illustration of the need for
Federal intervention in the field, see Department of Financial Institutions v. General
Finance Corporation, 227 Ind. 373, 86 N.E. 2d 444 (1949) (state's attempt to make regu-
lation of local finance companies effective by prohibiting local dealers from assigning to
foreign, unlicensed finance companies held unconstitutional).
25. RULE 3, supra note 24. See note 5 supra.
26. RULE 2, mtpra note 24. See note 6 supra.
The FTC's only concession to finance company and retailer arguments against the pre-
sale disclosure requirement, viz., that the seller cannot be expected to handle complicated
insurance manuals and rate chaTts separately prior to each sale, is a provision allowing
the disclosed insurance premium to be based partly on an estimate when its computation
is too complex for the retailer. But he must inform buyers that the markup is based on
an estimate and compensate for overcharges before the last installment is paid. See RULE
2 (II) (d) n.2.
The seller/finance company argument rests on shaky grounds. Some states have long
required pre-sale itemization without apparent interference with retail installment selling.
Significantly, the standard contract form used by one of the largest finance companies in
a state such as New York, which allows lumping, provides for lumping; but its California
and Pennsylvania forms, where itemization is required, provide for itemization without
reservation. See copies on file in Yale Law Library.
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to FTC cease and desist orders.27 While the FTC intends to leave local con-
sumer protection to states with equivalent disclosure laws,s automobile in-
stallment sales in other states will be under the Commission's surveillance.2
The FTC regulations' reach does not promise effective protection for in-
stallment buyers. Under its governing Congressional statute, the Commission's
jurisdiction extends only to transactions in "interstate commerce."3° The
Federal Trade Commission Act's comparatively slight control over "local"
practices may still permit a host of abuses to flourish. The rules, for example,
may not apply when a local seller extends installment credit to a local con-
sumer, or where the installment contract is assigned to a local finance com-
pany or any bank.3 1 And even for transactions "in" interstate commerce, the
Commission's scant enforcement staff cannot stalk a horde of violations.Y
2
Moreover, private enforcement is stymied by holdings that the Federal Trade
Commission Act grants injured consumers no private cause of action against
violators.33 Even if future decisions spelled out implied private remedies from
27. Under 52 STAT. 112 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §45(b) (1946). Noncompliance with cease
and desist orders after they become final is subject to a civil penalty of $5,000 for each
day of disobedience. 64 STAT. 21 (1950), 15 U.S.C.A. §45(1) (1951).
28. I.e., states listed supra note 17. See FTC "A tdo Pack" Rules Interpreted, mpra
note 24, at 36-7: "When instances of probable violation are brought to the attention of
the Commission in respect of which... the Federal Trade Commission Act is applicable,
reference for state attention shall be made when the state in which the transaction occurs
has legislation applicable to the practices and when ... the same or similar requirements
are imposed by it as by the rules."
29. COm2IUNICATION FRoM FTC CHAI.MAN; FTC "Auto Pack" Rules Interpreted,
supra note 24, at 35, 37.
30. Id. at 34-5. See also note 35 in! ra. For the statutory language, see note 24 supra.
"Commerce" is judicially defined as "interstate commerce." Chas. A. Brewer & Sons v.
Federal Trade Commission, 158 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1946). Under the Act, the Commission
has no power over "intrastate" activities even though they affect "interstate commerce."
See Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941); United States v.
Piuma, 40 F. Supp. 119 (D. Cal. 1941); Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competi-
tim, 62 HARv. L Rv. 987, 989 (1949). Cf. the broader intrastate reach of the Sherman
Act, Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1943)
("effects" test). For the apparently narrower test under the Robinson-Patman Act, see
Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231, 237-8 (1951).
31. 'When the charges relate e.xclusively or primarily to a motor vehicle financing
practice of a bank, such matters will be referred to the appropriate state or federal bank-
ing authorities, since banks are exempt from the Federal Trade Commission Act and
therefore are not amenable to the rules." CommumicATio. Fnon FTC CHuAmkA... See
also footnote to the Statement by the Commission preceding the RuLEs, 16 Fnr. REr.
1059 (1951).
32. Co-mmuNicAkoN FROM FTC CHAIMAN.
33. See, e.g., Samson Crane Co. v. Union National Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp 218 (D.
M.ass. 1949); aff'd imein. 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950). See further Bunn, The National
Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HsAv. L. REv. 937, 990 (1947) ; Rowe, Price Discrim na-
tion, Competition, and Confusion, 60 YAME L.J. 929, 974n. 284 (1951); Note, Federal
Jurisdiction in Suits for Damages mder Statutes Not Affording Such Remedy, 4S Ceo.
L REv. 1090 (1948).
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the Act's provisions, installment plan consumers might gain cold comfort:
comparatively minor amounts involved, together with the small purchaser's
lack of funds and ignorance of legal rights make private litigation seem un-
likely. 4 In fact, the FTC recognizes that where state law does not control
the problem, consumers for their protection must fall back largely on voluntary
compliance and "the elevating influence of the moral and ethical forces among
businessmen." 35 And prospects for stepped-up state controls seem dim.80
Even where enforced, the FTC's disclosure mandate may not safeguard
consumers. Timely and itemized disclosure of credit and insurance charges
might stimulate installment buyers to compare the cost of money loans from
credit agencies unaffiliated with finance companies or auto dealers.87 Since
states clamp ceilings on interest rates for money loans, consumers would
probably save by shifting their patronage to regulated money lenders, per-
mitting the purchase of goods with borrowed funds often repayable on an
installment basis.3 8 In this way competitive forces in the money-lending market
could eventually drive down the cost of installment sales.3 0 The FTC rules,
34. See Mors, stpra note 1, at 209. For discussions of implied private remedies under
statutes not expressly conferring them, see sources in note 33 supra.
35. ComtuNIcAATiON FRoM FTC CHAIRMIAN. See also FTC "Aulo Pack" Rules In-
terpreted, supra note 24, at 35.
In an effort to secure moral, if not legal commitment to abide by its rules, the FTC
has requested some 75,000 recipients of copies of the rules to sign "compliance cards"
and place their willingness to cooperate on record with the Commission. Id. at 34. But
finance companies doing largely an "intrastate" business are invited to strike out portions
of the cards to limit their moral commitment to "such of our business as is in coni-
merce." Id. at 35. "By signing the cards . . . one does not divest himself of any of his
legal rights or otherwise subject himself to the imposition of any restrictions not imposed
by existing law." CommIumcA oN FRoM FTC CHAIRMAN.
36. See, e.g., the reaction of Texas: "Whereas, the Federal Trade Commission has
prescribed rules [requiring presale disclosure], [i]t is the intention of this Act to preserve
to the seller his legal right to sell motor vehicles on a time credit price and at the salle
time permit him to make disclosure to the purchaser . . . [Disclosure] shall not in any
way affect the validity of the whole or any part of the time credit price, nor in any matner
change the legal nature of the time credit contract." Tax. STAT. ANN. tit. 79, art. 5074a,
§§ 1, 2 (Vernon's 1951 Supp.) (emphasis added). And see MICH. STA. ANN. § 9.1482
(1951 Supp.) (repealing requirement of pre-sale itemization of insurance and finance
charges in sale of motor vehicles).
But see CoNN. Ray. GEN. STAT. §§ 1222b, 1223b, 6699(b) (1951 Supp.) (lumping pro-
vision recently amended to require pre-sale itemization).
As to the modification of Regulation W in favor of lumping, see note 23 supra.
37. Outstanding retail credit is usually five times greater than outstanding cash loans,
despite borrower protection by usury statutes in the latter field. See Mors, supra note 1,
at 200. See also WIscoNsiN REPORT 30-2.
38. See note 1 supra. For a case where a seller unsuccessfully attempted to evade
money credit controls by disguising the transaction as a time-sale of an automobile, see
Nazarium v. Lincoln Finance Corp., 78 A.2d 7 (R.I. 1951).
39. "It naturally follows that when the purchaser is made aware of the amount of
finance charge and the cost of insurance separately, he is then in a position to 'shop' the
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however, do not press hard for this result. Finance charges need only be dis-
closed as a dollar amount. But unless charges are expressed in equivalent
annual interest rates, consumers cannot easily compare the costs of installment
sales and money loans. 40 Comparison is hampered, moreover, by a prevalent
practice of money lenders--disguising the true cost of installment loans by
stating interest as though the entire principal were outstanding during the
life of the loan.4 1 And not only may consumers be reluctant to overcome
inertia and inhibitions against making money loan inquiries, but also the
social taint frequently attaching to personal borrowing deters prospective
buyers from weighing this alternative form of financing.4 - Nor will disclosure
of a "packed" finance charge galvanize all consumers into competitive shop-
ping, since many installment buyers may not recognize an exorbitant over-
charge even when it is disclosed.43 Finally, disclosure rules cannot benefit the
many installment buyers who do not read or comprehend complex conditional
sales agreements.4
Absent effective competition between installment sales and money credit
markets, only outright state control of installment charges can provide con-
sumer protection. Outlawing the finance companies' practice of "kickbacks"
seller's competitors with a view to taldng advantage of the lowest charges offered. This
condition would certainly have a tendency to promote competition, both in the field of
financing and in the insurance field." CommiumxcAvo FRom FTC CHieraNws.. It is nfit
dear whether the "seller's competitors" referred to are only those in the retail sale credit
field or those in money or cash credit as well. But if retail credit sellers alone are meant,
the FTC's pre-sale itemization requirement is useless, for buyers could compare lumped
charges as easily as itemized charges. Lumping only prevents comparison of retail credit
and money credit costs.
40. See Mors, snpra note 1, at 212-8; WIscO.sIN Rns'oar 40-1; Lejislation, 63 HAv.
L REV. 874, 877n. 27 (1950). None of the state statutes requiring disclosure of markup
items require the finance charge to be stated as an equivalent annual interest rate. See
notes 17, 18 supra. In fact Maryland requires that it be stated as a dollar sum. MD. Auz.
CODE GEN. LAws art. 83, § 117(a) (9) (Cum. Supp. 1947). The statutes of New York and
Ohio permit statement of finance charges as either equivalent annual interest or dollar
sums. N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAw § 64-a(h) ; ORio CoDE § 6346-18 (Page's 1951 Supp.) (if
not over 8%).
Stating the cost of finance in terms of interest can also be deceptive, if the rate does
not reflect declining balances. See Ford Motor Company v. Federal Trade Commission,
120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1941) ("6% Plan" in reality disguising 11,2% simple interest).
See note 41 infra.
41. See Collins, Evasion and Avoidance of Usury Laws, 8 LAy: & Cons'z.Ap. ProD.
54, 56 (1941). See further BAcKMXAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 4-5.
42. See Mors, supra note 1, at 201-2.
43. See WiscoNsin REPoRT 40.
44. One solution suggested to overcome the "poor reading habits" of consumers is
the adoption of standard contract forms for retail sale credit, paralleling those in the in-
surance field. "[W]ithout reading the contract, the consumer soon becomes acquainted
with the details because of his own experience and [that] of his friends." H=nixa, Tun
INSTALMENT CREDIT C(.Nxwicr 22 (1939), quoted by Mors, supra note 1, at 60.
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to dealers might conceivably spark retail credit competition that would benefit
consumers: companies presently competing for trade by dealer rebates pre-
sumably would channel competition into rate reductions.4 6 But in the con-
text of the automobile market, competition may prove wholly ineffective. A
few finance companies tied to the major manufacturers dominate the field ;40
and franchised dealers in the past have been coerced to discount consumer
45. "To get credit prices down to the consumer necessitates easing retail dealer pres-
sure on financing agencies for ever increasing financial concessions ... By getting directly
at this pressure, rate control and kick-back control may actually operate to increase
rather than to decrease the effectiveness of (price) competition in retail instalment financ-
ing." Mors, supra note 1, at 59.
An alternative to such controls on rebates would be disclosure of the rebate as well
as markup items. See WIscoNsIN REPORT 60. But it is doubtful whether consumers, who
may not understand finance charges, see note 40 supra, will comprehend the significance
and economics of dealer participation in finance charges. See Note, 60 YALX L. J. 1218
(1951). The Trade Practice Conference held before adoption of the FTC's rules, see note
24 supra, discussed controls on dealer participations and rebates. See Press Release, ibid.
Although the rules developed from this conference do not expressly deal with the subject,
the Commission has intimated that abusive dealer rebates might violate RULE 4. See
compilation of excerpts from the Commission's replies to questions, accompanying COM-
MUNICATION FRoM FTC CHAIRMAN.
46. See FTC, REPORT ON MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 921-2 (1939) ; Cavers, The Con-
snmer's Stake in the Finance Company Code Controversy, 2 LAW & CONT'MP. PRoD. 200,
201-2 (1935). See further Moss, Sales Finance Company Operation in 1947, 34 FoE, REs,
Buu. '781 (1948); Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1218, 1219n. 5 (1951).
On the basis of their relationship to automobile manufacturers, finance companies are
classified as (1) factory-controlled, (2) factory-preferred, and (3) non-factory-related
or independent. Finance companies which control the field, General Motors Acceptance
Corporation, Commercial Credit Co., Commercial Investment Trust Corporation, with its
subsidiary Universal Credit Corporation, have been placed in the first two categories. See
FTC REPORT, op. cit. supra, at 921-2. In 1938 the federal government took steps to separate
these finance companies from affiliated manufacturers under the Sherman Act. Chrysler
and Ford took consent decrees, see Chrysler Corporation v. United States, 316 U.S. 556
(1942), modified CCH TRADE Rita. REP. 162,221 (N.D. Ind. 1948) and Ford Motor Co. v.
United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948), while General Motors resisted and lost in a criminal
action. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 618, rehearing dcnied, 314 U.S. 710 (1941). Decrees against Chrysler and Ford
were conditional upon a final order within a specified period requiring General Motors
to divest itself of all interest in its financial subsidiary, GMAC. The Government did not
obtain a final order within the period, although numerous extensions were allowed. Ford
appealed from the sixth extension, whereupon the Supreme Court lifted, until identical
terms are imposed on General Motors, the decree's prohibition against affiliating with,
recommending, endorsing, or advertising any finance company. Ford Motor Company v.
United States, 335 U.S. 303, 320 (1948). Chrysler obtained similar relaxations of its con-
sent decree by motion on March 29, 1949. See Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL
from Clerk, U.S. District Court of Indiana, dated March 31, 1952, on file in Yale Law
Library. As gutted, the decrees still stand against Ford and Chrysler pending outcome of
the government's dormant severance suit against General Motors and GMAC, Civil Action
No. 2177, in the District Court of the United States, Northern District of Illinois, filed
October 4, 1940, complaint amended June 21, 1941.
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installment paper exclusively with the manufacturer's financing affiliate.47
But even if financing companies competitively lowered credit charges, dealers
rather than consumers might reap the gain. New-car dealers with exclusive
territorial franchises are largely insulated from competitive forces. And com-
petition among used-car dealers is not effective since customers cannot com-
pare and evaluate the different products on the market. Direct controls of
installment charges, analogous to present regulation of money lending, may
therefore have to supplant disclosure and competition to safeguard consumers
from abuse in installment selling.48
47. United States v. General Motors Corporation, 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941) ; ei.
Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951), Note, 61 YAM. L J.
417 (1952) ; and see cases cited note 46 supra.
Cf. Justice Black's dissent in the Supreme Court's decision relaxing the Ford consent
decree: "Hereafter dealers and retail purchasers cannot depend on competiton to keep
interest rates at a fair level. Their sole hope for low interest rates and loans on liberal
terms will be the spontaneous generosity of Ford, General 'Motors, and Chrysler." Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303, 328 (1948).
48. "Public interest demands that such a purchaser have as much protection thrown
around him as if he were a borrower." WiscoNsmx REPORT 25. See note 2 sucpra. Disclosure
would still be desirable, even with all-out rate controls: "Even with a ceiling on rates, it
may be possible to conceal a limited 'pack' unless . . . the contract contains a separate
listing of finance and insurance charges." BACEMAx, op. cit. stpra note 1, at 6 n.2.
As to factors to be considered in fixing finance charges, see Wisco sx REror 50:
"[W]hile charges to the consumer should be as low as possible, they should not be so
low as to prevent capital from entering the consumer credit field. Otherwise, competition
will be stifled, and interest rates instead of decreasing will increase. Furthermore, there
is grave danger when finance charges and interest rates are too low of driving the smaller
individual companies out of business and turning such business over to the national com-
panies ... It should be further realized that a small item of consumer credit entails as
much detail as a large extension of credit in a bank. . . Finance companies must keep a
large reserve of cash on hand, and the cost of money has to be considered as a factor in
the business." See further Note, 60 YALX L. J. 1218, 1225 n. 24, 1226-7 (1951). Cf. Upton,
The Economics of Fair Charges for Consumer Loans, 16 Mo. I- REv. 274 (1951). And
see Hawaii's statutory control, note 23 supra.
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